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SAVE OUR SHIPS: HOW U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS AFFECT THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF STRANDED
SEAFARERS AS A RESULT OF
SHIPPING BANKRUPTCIES
INTRODUCTION

B

efore its financial downfall in 2016, Hanjin Shipping Company _9HanJin8^ was the world’s seventh largest shipping
company.1 Established in 1977, the South Korean company was
the shipping leader in South Korea for nearly four decades.2 In
:outh Sorea, HanJin do/inated as one oL the Qountry’s chaebol3
companies, which are largely run by family members. The company was founded in the 1970s, when the country was experiencing an economic boom, largely attributable to such familyowned conglomerates.4 Traditionally, these conglomerates were
seen as 9too big to Lail8 and struQturally and eQono/iQally too
viable to ever experience financial downfalls.5
In general, however, the global shipping industry had been operating at a loss since 2015.6 Beginning largely in 2016, Hanjin
also began experiencing financial strain attributed to the oversupply of ships without proper demand, as well as an overall economic downturn.7 Nearing bankruptcy, in January 2016, Hanjin
sought assistance from its creditors for financial assistance to
1. The Fall of Hanjin Shipping, HELLENIC SHIPPING NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016),
http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/the-fall-of-hanjin-shipping/.
2. Id.
3. Emily Cashen, The collapse of Hanjin Shipping makes waves in South
Korea’s business culture, WORLD FIN. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-collapse-of-hanjin-shipping-makes-waves-in-southkoreas-business-culture. In Korean, the term chaebol refers to large family
groups that control many of South Korea’s major industries. Carlos Tejada,
Money, Power, Family: Inside South Korea’s Chaebol, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17,
2017), at B2. Some of these groups are becoming household names, even outside of South Korea, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and Kia. Id.
4. Cashen, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Sohee Kim and Kyunghee Park, Hanjin’s Ghost Ships Seek Havens With
Food and Water Starting to Dwindle, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2016, 7:30 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-06/hanjin-s-ghost-shipsseek-havens-as-food-water-start-to-dwindle.
7. Id.
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keep business operations running.8 An estimated 1.3 trillion
won9 was needed for the company to stay afloat, but none of its
major creditors offered enough money to support the operation.10
By the summer of 2016, Hanjin scrambled to raise its liquidity,
looking to its creditors for assistance in efforts to rehabilitate its
debt.11 Specifically, Hanjin sought help from two of its major
creditors, Korea Development Bank and Korean Airlines.12 In
responding to *uestions about HanJin’s LinanQial state, Sorea
Development Bank chairman, Lee Dong-geol, commented that
9it’s liHe pouring water into a botto/less pit. Any new loans will
be spent to cover its overdue debt owed to foreign creditors, rather than being used to boost its Qorporate valueZ813 For a company on the verge of bankruptcy, the first step is to attempt a
rehabilitation plan that will ask creditors for cash for the company to stay afloat. When it became apparent that the Korean
govern/ent and HanJin’s largest Qreditors were not enthusiastiQ
about the Qo/pany’s rehabilitation eLLorts to raise Lunds, HanJin
filed for receivership in South Korea on August 31, 2016.14 Subsequently, Hanjin sought bankruptcy protection in forty-three
countries, where Hanjin vessels were waiting, idly anchored out
at sea for the next course of action.15 The ability for the crew
members aboard Hanjin vessels to come ashore would normally
have been granted through temporary shore leave provisions set
by international regulations and conventions. The United
8. The Fall of Hanjin Shipping, supra note 1.
9. This is approximately $1.1 billion USD.
10. The Fall of Hanjin Shipping, supra note 1; Kim & Park, supra note 6.
11. Xiaolin Zeng, Hanjin Submits Plan to Raise Cash, May Sell More Assets,
JOC.COM (Aug. 25, 2016, 10:19 AM), http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/hanjin-shipping/hanjin-submits-plan-raise-cash-may-sell-moreassets_20160825.html.
12. Id.
13. Jhoo Dong-Chan, Creditors Reject Lifeline For Hanjin Shipping, KOREA
TIMES
(Aug.
30,
2016,
1:50
PM),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2016/08/123_213050.html.
14. The Fall of Hanjin Shipping, supra note 1; Jon Chesman and Laura
Crawford, Stormy Waters for the Shipping Industry? LEXOLOGY (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7e24ad65-a6ef-4c15-a26867be0c0388c5. Receivership provides creditor protection. Costas Paris and InSoo Nam, Move by South Korea’s Hanjin Shipping Roils Global Trade, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2016, 3:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/troubled-hanjinshipping-to-sell-healthy-assets-to-rival-1472611190. It gives the filing party
the chance to restructure while undergoing bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
15. Kim & Park, supra note 6.
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States, however, refuses to grant shore leave without proper
crew member visas.16 Specifically for Hanjin ship docked in U.S.
waters, crewmembers remained anchored and were denied
shore leave due to national security policies.17
An estimated six hundred billion won was needed to cover fuel
and food for the crews.18 A typical Hanjin vessel carries around
twenty-four crew members and provisions intended to last for
several weeks.19 Food and other provisions are allocated according to the length of the voyage, with emergency provisions in
case of emergency.20 These emergency provisions are not, however, expected to last beyond several weeks.21
Some crewmembers aboard vessels, such as the Scarlet and
the Vienna, which were docked off of the coast of British Columbia, had employment contracts that were ending and did not
know the fate of their future on board these stranded vessels.22
By Dece/ber EXFA, the vessels’ supplies were running low and
the holiday season was approaching without an update on how
much longer the crew would need to stay on the anchored ship.23
The crews aboard the Scarlet and Vienna were fortunate enough
to benefit from the care packages and provisions provided by local unions and interest groups that ventured out to the vessels
to bring holiday cheer to the crew.24 The majority of the crewmembers, however, remained on board because their shore leave
was denied.25 In such an air of uncertainty, crewmember morale
sunk, as they ran out of ways to keep themselves occupied, and
provisions began to dwindle.26
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Amy Smart, An Early Christmas for Hanjin Crew, Facing an Uncertain
Future, TIMES COLONIST (Dec. 21, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.timescolonist.com/news/local/an-early-christmas-for-hanjin-crew-facing-an-uncertainfuture-1.5109240.
23. Matt Meuse, Hanjin Scarlet Crew to Receive Carols, Holiday Care Packages, CBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2016, 2:03 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/hanjin-scarlet-crew-care-packages-1.3896703.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Sam Dawson and Jeff Engels, ITF: Refusal of Shore Leave to Hanjin
Crews ‘A Denial of Human Rights,’ INT’L TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FED’N (Sept. 28,
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E/bedded within the Qo/pany’s LinanQial Qrisis was a proble/
that Hanjin seemed to be ignoring.27 #/idst HanJin’s banH[
ruptcy crisis was this strange and much more personal and human issue of crew members who were stuck on their ships, unable to return home or set foot on land in order to replenish their
food and water supplies or even seek medical attention. When a
shipping company with over eighty ships files for bankruptcy
protection, the ripple effects go as far as the crewmembers that
work to deliver cargo from one point to the next. There is a need
for solutions that directly address the reality that human beings
were stranded at sea while the company fights over assets in
bankruptcy proceedings.28 There are several issues to be aware
of with respect to the Hanjin bankruptcy, with a focus here on
the crews that were stranded along the coasts of the United
States.29 In contrast with the United States visa requirement
are the international labor regulations enforced by institutions,
such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the
International Labour Organization (ILO). Accordingly, there are
local regulations in the United States that are in conflict with
various international conventions and regulations, and that the
Hanjin crewmembers needed to be granted temporary shore
leave in such a situation where the restructuring of Hanjin was
uncertain.30 Specifically, the United States adopted regulations
that require seafarers to have visas in order to come ashore at
any one of its ports.31 Given the severity of the issue, the fact

2016),
http://www.itfglobal.org/en/news-events/press-releases/2016/september/itf-refusal-of-shore-leave-to-hanjin-crews-a-denial-of-human-rights/.
At
the time of publication, the Hanjin Scarlet crew was finally able to return home
after months at sea despite the ship remaining anchored and still for sale because of Hanjin’s bankruptcy. The twenty-two-person crew reported that they
were ecstatic to return to their homes in South Korea and the Philippines after
four and a half months. Sarah Petrescu, Hanjin Scarlet Crew Preparing to Go
Home This Week, BUS. VANCOUVER (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.biv.com/article/2017/1/hanjin-scarlet-crew-preparing-go-home-week/.
27. Dawson & Engels, supra note 26.
28. See Andreas Illmer, ‘We Don’t Have a Future’—Hanjin Crews Return to
Uncertain Fate, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business37604082.
29. Id.
30. Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised) (No. 185), June 19,
2003, 2304 U.N.T.S. 121 [hereinafter ILO 185].
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-195, MARITIME SECURITY:
FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS TO ADDRESS RISKS POSED BY
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that the crew members were eventually allowed to return home
does not make the original denial of shore leave a lesser concern
for the international community. The original obstacle, the
United States visa requirement, still remains in effect and until
the United States loosens these requirements, seafarers will be
unable to exercise their rights to come ashore in the event of
such uncertain situations as a complete collapse of their employer.
Part I of this Note will provide a primer on abandoned vessels
and seaLarers’ basiQ rightsZ This Part will eaplain the proble/s
that crewmembers aboard Hanjin vessels were faced with as the
company filed for bankruptcy protection in South Korea and
then across the world. As a direct result of the bankruptcy proceedings, all Hanjin ships were unable to dock in their destination ports and were forced to anchor in open water to avoid seizure of their cargo, which made crewmembers unable to leave
the ships. Further, the United States denied these crews shore
leave, leaving them stranded on their vessels. Part II will then
analyze the law related to the rights of seafarers, both from a
customary law and international law perspective. This Part will
introduQe the :eaLarers’ Udentity foQu/ents !onvention _9UL=
F?B8^, whiQh QodiLies shore leave and direQtly QonLliQts with the
U.S. visa requirement for foreign seafarers. ILO 185 is crucial to
the changes needed in the United States, as it requires identity
documents that have biometric readings. Part III will then disQuss the i/paQt oL the 7nited :tates’ striQt stanQe on seaLarer
rights. Presently, the United States is the only nation that imposes a visa requirement for seafarers seeking temporary shore
leave through one of its ports. This Part will also highlight different interest groups, including the International Transport
WorHers’ Wederation _9UTW8^, that have shed light on the impracticality of the U.S. visa requirement. Finally, Part IV will offer
solutions that the United States should implement, including
getting rid of its visa requirement, adopting ILO 185 because of
the overwhelming international response to the Hanjin ship arrests and the treatment of shipping bankruptcies in the future
in order to achieve conformity with international regulations
and conventions, and implementing the seafarer identity documents that ILO 185 has established.
SEAFARERS,
BUT
EFFORTS
CAN
BE
STRENGTHENED
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/314625.pdf [hereinafter GAO].

8

(2011),
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I. HANJIN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS AND SHIP ARREST
After Hanjin filed for receivership in Seoul, South Korea, the
Qo/pany’s vessels beQa/e i//ediately vulnerable to sei`ure by
creditors seeking to collect unpaid bills and other assets.32 Ports
in the United States and the rest of the world refused entry of
Hanjin ships out of concern that the ships would not be able to
pay port fees or that their cargo would be seized by Hanjin creditors.33 Additionally, ports in the United States are unwilling to
grant crews from coming ashore without prior authorizations in
the form of visas.34 In the post September 11th world, national
security became a top priority and certain rules and regulations,
to be discussed in this Part, became law despite their incongruence with international agreements.35
Hanjin was struggling to keep its head above water for a few
years prior to filing for bankruptcy protection.36 The company
felt the brunt of major issues in the shipping industry, likely due
to its sheer size and presence in the industry.37 The downturn of
the shipping industry can be attributed to its failure to adapt to
the post-financial crisis economy.38 Companies have continued
to grow their fleets and purchase newer and better ships despite
the decrease in demand for shipping, while other methods of
transport such as overnight air freight become more popular for
its speed.39 Hanjin was one such shipping giant that suffered the
long-term effects of these business decisions.40
Before discussing the severity of these denials of entry, it is
important to understand how this situation arose. This Part will
first describe the Hanjin bankruptcy proceedings, detailing
32. Hanjin Shipping Is Trying to Stop Its Ships From Being Seized,
FORTUNE (Sept. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/05/hanjin-shipping-ships/.
33. Kim & Park, supra note 6. For perspective on how much these fees can
be, Sohee Kim and Kyunghee Park reported that a ship carrying eight thousand cargo boxes would have to pay $35,000 USD in port fees alone. Id.
34. Id.
35. Douglas B. Stevenson, The Burden That 9/11 Imposed on Seafarers, 77
TULANE L. REV. 1407, 1407 (June 2003).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Michael Murray, Explainer: Why Hanjin’s ships are stranded around the
globe,
ABC
NEWS
AUS.
(Sept.
15,
2016,
12:35
AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-15/explainer-why-hanjin-ships-arestranded-around-the-globe/7847626.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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background information on ship arrests, what they are, why
they occur, and how they applied to the Hanjin story. This Part
will then describe the unique psychological and emotional issues
plaguing seafarers while they are out at sea and away from society, including an isolated environment without consistent contact with their loved ones and a skewed sense of reality while
surrounded by their colleagues for an extended period of time.
A. Hanjin Ship Stranded and Background on Ship Arrest
Un 7nited :tates’ waters, the HanJin Marine was stranded oLL
the port of Seattle with twenty-four crewmembers aboard.41
When the United States denied the crew shore leave, the international community, through trade unions and watchdogs, created an uproar, exclaiming that the human rights of the crewmembers were being violated.42 Before discussing these rights,
however, it is crucial to understand the context and players involved in a shipping bankruptcy, including how Hanjin arrived
at this point.
Sensing trouble in the company, in 2016, Hanjin creditors began to act, even before the official bankruptcy filing, obtaining

41. MarEx, Stranded Hanjin Crew Denied Shore Leave, MAR. EXECUTIVE
(Oct. 5, 2016, 1:16 PM), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/strandedhanjin-crew-denied-shore-leave-in-seattle.
42. Id. To illustrate the continuing complexity of shipping bankruptcies, it
may be helpful to consider other crews stranded off of the shore of the United
Arab Emirates, although the scope of this Note focuses on the United States’
denial of seafarer shore leave. As of July 5, 2017, the Indian Consulate of the
UAE reported that there were at least 100 seafarers stranded across twentytwo different merchant vessels, most of which belong to smaller shipping companies that do not garner as much media attention as Hanjin. FOCUS: Hundreds of Seafarers Held Captive Off UAE Coast, HELLENIC SHIPPING NEWS (July
5, 2017), http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/focus-hundreds-of-seafarersheld-captive-off-uae-coast/. The crews were stranded on their ships without adequate supplies of food and water, while continuing uncertainty remained
about lost wages for several months. While some captains and higher-ranked
crewmembers were repatriated to their home countries, mainly back to India,
the remaining crew members have been stranded for months. The story explains that the fragmented nature of employment in a shipping company complicates efforts to help the stranded seafarers. Since most of the crew members
were hired through shipping companies in their home countries and then contracted to work on other vessels, it is sometimes difficult to even determine
who to contact.
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warrants for ship arrests across the world.43 Maritime claims are
unique in the fact that ships themselves are constantly moving
through waters and can be hard to secure and preserve in time
and space.44 Maritime law allows for a maritime lien to be placed
on the vessel itself, which enables the party to file a suit against
the named ship.45 The lien allows creditors to bring lawsuits directly against the vessels for unpaid bills.46 The fear for the company is that its vessels become vulnerable to lawsuits by any and
potentially all of its creditors.47
The easiest and most effective way for a creditor to secure a
ship in place for purposes of establishing jurisdiction in a lawsuit
is to arrest the ship.48 Arresting the ship prevents it from leaving
port.49 Specifically, a creditor can have a court marshal board
the vessel and attaQh the arrest warrant to the ship’s Qabin, eL[
fectively preventing the ship from traveling.50 The vessel will be
anchored wherever it is located at the time of the arrest and
must remain there until the resolution of the court proceeding
that initiated the arrest.51 In the United States, a U.S. Marshal
will go aboard the ship and physically take charge of it by posting a notice of arrest on the vessel.52 Once this occurs, the owner
loses control of the vessel, which is why ship owners try tirelessly to avoid ship arrest.53

43. See 19 Crew Members Still On Board Arrested Hanjin Ship, ASIA ONE
(Oct. 1, 2016), http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/19-crew-members-stillonboard-arrested-hanjin-ship-0 (discussing creditors’ actions to arrest ships in
Singapore even before Hanjin filed for bankruptcy protection in South Korea).
44. Hanjin Shipping Collapse Timeline, And All The Latest News On the
Crisis, SEATRADE MAR. NEWS (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/americas/hanjin-shipping-collapse-timeline.html; Murray, supra note 38.
45. Hanjin Shipping Collapse Timeline, And All The Latest News On The
Crisis, supra note 44.
46. Murray, supra note 38.
47. Id.
48. Arrest of Ships, SEAFARERS’ RTS. (Feb. 20, 2015), http://seafarersrights.org/seafarers-fact-file-ship-arrest/.
49. Id.
50. Murray, supra note 38.
51. Arrest of Ships, supra note 48.
52. Maritime Practice & Procedure, Arrest of Vessel, MAR. L. CENTER,
http://www.maritimelawcenter.com/html/arrest_of_vessel.html (last visited
Aug. 17, 2017).
53. Id.
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Ship arrest is governed largely by the International Convention ;elating to the #rrest oL :eagoing :hips _9F>BE !onven[
tion8^, whiQh was signed in 1952 and established uniform rules
surrounding ship arrest.54 The 1952 Convention was signed by
seventy-seven countries, including both South Korea and the
United States.55 The 1952 Convention set rules for when a state
has the authority to prevent a ship from moving or unloading
cargo until the resolution of the claim or court proceeding in
question.56
When a ship is arrested, the crew remains on board to protect
the cargo and to carry on their duties as employees. The arrests
of the Hanjin ships, however, were controversial because, pending bankruptcy proceedings, the ships and their crews were anchored for months without shore leave, causing concern amongst
the international community.57 Hanjin creditors quickly sought
warrants to arrest Hanjin ships when the company filed for
bankruptcy protection in South Korea.58 Since it was apparent
that Hanjin was low on cash, creditors arrested Hanjin vessels
to collect their money, as it allowed them to have a legal claim
to other sources of assets, such as the ship’s /ortgage, that
would be valuable enough to pay off the large bills owed.59
B. The Psychological Effects of Being Stranded at Sea
Amidst the bankruptcy proceedings and the legal battles that
Hanjin was enduring, the dozens of Hanjin shipping vessels remained at sea, waiting to hear their next orders from the corporation.60 Aboard the ships, thousands of crewmembers would
soon learn that they would have to remain on their ships indefinitely, to no fault of their own.61 The shipping industry encompasses more than 1.2 million seafarers, all of whom are subject
54. See International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships,
May 10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 6330.
55. Arrest of Ships, supra note 48.
56. Soumyajit Dasgupta, Ship Arrest Under Maritime Law: Reasons, Procedure, and Precautions, MARINE INSIGHT (July 21, 2016), http://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/ship-arrest-under-maritime-law-reasons-procedureand-precautions/.
57. Dawson & Engels, supra note 26.
58. Id.
59. See id.; see also 19 Crew Members Still On Board Arrested Hanjin Ship,
supra note 43.
60. 19 Crew Members Still On Board Arrested Hanjin Ship, supra note 43.
61. See id.
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to the unique nature of their employment, including the sociological and psychological particularities of being out at sea for
extended periods of time.62 Sociological studies surrounding the
nature of seafaring employment describe the mental state of a
seafarer as one who is cut off from society and enclosed within
the steel structure of the vessel.63 furing the seaLarer’s e/ploy[
ment, he or she is limited to experiencing life, social situations,
and personal emotions within the vessel.64 Studies show that
even with the advent of technology and the ease of global communication, the seafaring profession remains just as psychologically and emotionally challenging.65
The problems of the shipping industry are constantly discussed by scholars and practitioners alike. Conferences such as
the Ergoship 2016, hosted by the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority and the Australian Maritime College, sought to provide an international forum for the discussion of the human factors within the maritime context.66 At this particular conference,
presenter Johan Smith from the University of Cape Town concluded in his studies that human beings are not able to survive
at sea.67 He noted that 9we are inseparably attaQhed to the shore
Lor our every need8 and that the shipping industry has Qontinued
to operate without properly addressing the human factor and
this connection to the shore.68 He added that the industry fails
to realize that their most valuable asset are the human beings
62. Iliana Christodoulou-Varotsi, Critical Review of the Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (2006) of the International Labour Organization: Limitations and Perspectives, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 467, 481 (Oct. 2012).
63. Johan Smith, Wellness at Sea: A New Conceptual Framework for Seafarer
Training,
ERGOSHIP
2016,
at
3,
http://eprints.utas.edu.au/22788/1/Ergo%20Ship%20Wellness%20at%20Sea%20Paper_Johan%20Smith.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1.
66. Ergoship 2016NMaritime Human Factors Conference, NAUTICAL INST.,
http://www.nautinst.org/en/events/index.cfm/Ergoship2016 (last visited July
23, 2017). Specifically, the conference focused on different methods of applying
these maritime human factors principles to ship design, ship operations, and
research. Id.
67. Smith, supra note 63.
68. Id. Further, Smith opines that, 9while seafarers’ unique environment
separates them from others, the common humanity we as people share unites
them. Thus, not only will the uniqueness of their environment influence a new
conceptual framework, but also the everyday humanness of them having ideas,
feelings, emotions, needs and values.8 Id.
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aboard their vessels who are responsible for carrying out the actual deliveries of goods.69 When a crew is out at sea, he argued
that the constructs of their social space attempt to mimic the
spaces that humans have on land.70 The problem lies in the fact
that the crew members work together all day on the ship and
continue to live and socialize with each other.71 On land, however, the average employee is able to escape their work environment and switch over to different social spheres, such as home
and family or other communities.72
Despite the social difficulties of being out at sea, there is a high
demand for seafarer jobs, creating competition within the profession to secure their own employment contracts regardless of
health or personal issues.73 Yet, seafarers live and work aboard
the vessel on which they are employed for extended periods of
time.74 This connection to the vessel, without shore leave, affects
the mental health and wellness of a seafarer, who may be less
diligent in his or her duties, potentially leading to a major accident at sea.75 The competitive seafarer industry, however, provokes seafarers to evade the truth about their medical histories,
fearing rejection from a possible job prospect.76
Reports from Hanjin vessels attest to the grueling nature of
being out at sea. The Hanjin Rome was anchored off the coast of
Singapore for over a month,77 where the crew told reporters that
they were nervous and uncomfortable.78 A student aboard the
ship as a part oL his apprentiQeship told reporters that 9/entally,
U Lelt trappedZ879 A Bloomberg article reported that Hanjin denied requests for food and water made by ship captains, though

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Smith, supra note 63, at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See How To Achieve Health and Well-being If You Are A Seafarer,
CREWTOO,
http://www.crewtoo.com/uncategorized/health-and-well-being-ifyou-are-a-seafarer/.
76. Wendy Laursen, Keeping Watch on Seafarer Health, MAR. EXECUTIVE
(Nov. 11, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.maritime-executive.com/magazine/maritime-rx-maintaining-seafarer-wellness.
77. 19 Crew Members Still On Board Arrested Hanjin Ship, supra note 43.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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it was not clear why.80 The captain, who declined to use his
na/e, stated that 9there should be /easures to seQure the saLety
oL sailorsZ881 He added that they did not know how long they
would be waiting at sea for assistance or for further directions.82
II. THE LAWS ON SEAFARER RIGHTS
Knowing that seafaring was traditionally dangerous and unpredictable, states moved to codify and regulate the profession.83
The origins of these rights were contemplated long before any of
these international organizations came into being. For as long
as there was ocean travel, people have looked out for the interests of seafaring individuals. This Part will discuss the different
laws and organizations that specifically address seafarer safety
and security, starting with the customary international law,
which recognized temporary leave for seafarers. This Part will
then describe the international organizations that have created
an enforcement regime addressing maritime security and safety,
specifically the International Maritime Organization and the International Labour Organization. In detailing these organizations, this Part will discuss the origins of the International Maritime Organization and how it serves to protect the rights of
maritime workers through conventions and international enforcement of regulations, as well as the creation of the International Labour Organization, which is equally as crucial to the
proteQtion oL seaLarers’ rightsZ
A. Customary International Law
Seafaring was always unique in that the crews would be
aboard these vessels for extended periods of time, unable to
touch land for months at a time. Originally, the right to temporary leave from the vessel was recognized by old maritime customs through the Laws of Wisby in the sixteenth century and

80. Kim & Park, supra note 6.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. History
of
Safety
at
Sea,
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSafetyatSea/Pages/default.aspx.
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the Code of Oleron.84 Carrying the weight of customary international law, these ancient admiralty codes laid out rules for when
seafarers would be granted shore leave.85 The codes presume
that shore leave will be provided to seafarers as a part of maritime life.86 Specifically, Article XX of the Code of Oleron allowed
seafarers to go ashore to eat, rest, and breathe the air on the
land.87 In a field of work that carries so much history, seafarers
and the global community have looked back to ancient traditions
to establish their rights.
B. International Law of Maritime Safety and Seafarer Rights
The international arena has largely recognized the need for
proteQtion oL seaLarers’ rightsZ !arrying over the traditions oL
customary international law, conventions were held to discuss
and codify seafarer rights. This Subpart will introduce the international organizations that have created an enforcement regime
addressing maritime security and safety, specifically the convention that created seafarer identification document standards
that strive to uniLy the shipping industry’s shore leave stand[
ards.
1. International Maritime Organization
=ne organi`ation targeted toward seaLarers’ rights is the UM=,
which was established through convention by the United Nations in 1948 as the first international body devoted solely to

84. See Stevenson, supra note 35, at n.3; see also The Laws of Wisby arts.
XXXIII, LIV, reprinted in Alexander Justice, A General Treatise of the Dominion of the Sea and a Competent Body of the Sea-Laws 182, 187 (3d ed. 1710).
85. Stevenson, supra note 35.
86. Id.
87. Id. Specifically, the language of the article reads as follows:
When a vessel arrives at Bordeaux, or any other place, two of the mariners at
a time may go ashore, and take with them one meal of such victuals as are in
the ship, therein cut and provided; as also bread proportionably as much as
they eat at once, but no drink: and they ought very speedily, and in season, to
return to their vessel, that thereby the master may not lose his tide; for if so,
and damage come thereby, they are bound to make satisfaction; or if any of
their company be hurt for want of their help, they are to be at such charge for
his recovery, as one of his fellow mariners, or the master, with those of his table
shall judge convenient. THE RULES OF OLERON, ADMIRALTY L. GUIDE,
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/documents/oleron.html.
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maritime issues.88 MuQh oL the UM=’s LoQus revolves around /ar[
itime safety, specifically the shipping industry and its technicalities at sea, such as fire protection of ships, radio technology, and
carriage of dangerous goods.89 Especially during the Industrial
Revolution, as the international commerce industry was booming, the need for uniform standards on shipping, specifically
shipping safety, became increasingly necessary.90
Structurally, the IMO currently has 170 Member States and
three Associate Members, who run it as a technical organization
and carry out its objectives through committees and sub-committees.91 The IMO has its own Secretary-General who is appointed by the organization’s !ounQil, with approval by its #s[
sembly.92 Since its existence, the organization has adopted 50
conventions and protocols with over 1,000 codes and recommendations, all concerning maritime safety and security.93 The
UM=’s Qo//ittees are tasHed with disQussing developments in
shipping and identifying issues that should be addressed in
amendments to existing conventions or codified in new conventions.94 When seeking to enter one of these conventions into
force, the IMO must obtain approval and acceptance from its individual Member State governments.95 A convention becomes
binding on all governments that ratify it.96 Enforcement of IMO
conventions depends on the Member States and their individual
governments by establishing infringement penalties and appropriate remedies according to guidance in the conventions.97 In

88. See
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
IMO:
WHAT
IT
IS
2,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Documents/What%20it%20is%20Oct%202013_Web.pdf. For a list of IMO Member
States, see id. at 22.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Adopting a Convention, Entry Into Force, Accession, Amendment, Enforcement,
Tacit
Acceptance
Procedure,
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited July
23, 2017) [hereinafter Adopting a Convention].
91. INT’L MAR. ORG., supra note 88, at 2.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Adopting a Convention, supra note 90.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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some instances, the conventions can be enforced on a much more
micro level, by the officer of the ship itself.98
At its inception, the IMO was made responsible for conventions that were already in force, including the original International !onvention on :aLety oL LiLe at :ea _9:=L#:8^, adopted in
1914.99 The first conference held by IMO was progressive in immediately recognizing the need for safety measures and minimum safety standards of seafaring vessels after the sinking of
the Titanic.100 The convention stands as one of the pillars of the
international regulatory regime for quality shipping because it
is one of the foundations of safety regulations at sea.101
The current iteration of SOLAS, which was promulgated in
1974, specifically aims to further codify the rights and protections regarding health and safety of crewmembers on board the
vessel through its adoption of a tacit acceptance procedure.102
The new procedure provides that an amendment shall enter into
force automatically on a specific date, unless objections are submitted from an agreed upon number of parties.103 With this new
procedure, the IMO and SOLAS have gained a stronger reputation as an enforcement power in the international community.104
The provisions, Hnown as 9port state Qontrols,8 allow Me/ber
States to inspect ships of other Member States if there are clear
grounds to believe that the ship is not meeting any of the SOLAS
standards.105
98. The SOLAS Convention of 1974 allows 9the officer carrying out the control [to] take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail until it can
proceed to sea without danger to the passengers or the crew.8 Adopting a Convention, supra note 90.
99. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,
INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),1974.aspx (last visited July 23, 2017).
100. Id.
101. Charris Chryssanthakopoulos, A Student Perspective: The Four Pillars
of the International Regulatory Regime For Quality Shipping And The Greek
Paradigm, GREENWICH MAR. CENTRE BLOG (Apr. 14, 2014), https://maritimeatgreenwich.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/a-student-perspective-the-four-pillarsof-the-international-regulatory-regime-for-quality-shipping-and-the-greekparadigm/.
102. INT’L MAR. ORG., supra note 88.
103. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,
supra note 99.
104. See id.
105. See id.
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Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS established the International Ship and
Port WaQility :eQurity !ode _9U:P: !ode8^, whiQh provides a
workable set of security standards in response to the post-September 11th era of security.106 Members of the IMO were fearful
that merchant ships could be used by terrorists to transport
weapons or people.107 The ISPS Code was thus created to establish an international framework that encourages cooperation between contracting governments, government agencies, and local
administrations by assessing potential threats to ships and ports
and implementing preventative measures to reduce those
threats.108 The ISPS Code provides protection for Member States
against security threats to ports and vessels by establishing protocols and security measures that are enforced and practiced by
every Member State.109
The 2002 SOLAS Amendments to the ISPS Code specifically
address the human element of seafaring by urging its Contracting Governments to take into the account the need for special
protections of seafarers.110 The conference resolution adopted on
December 12, 2002 (Conference Resolution 11), encourages
Members to consider the global nature of the shipping industry
and bring any contrary issues to the attention of the IMO.111 The
ISPS Code and Conference Resolution 11 define the respite and
relief that seafarers need as shore leave.112 Conference Resolution 11 also highlights that seafarers must be allowed ashore
when they arrive to port after long voyages.113

106. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,
supra note 99; FAQ on ISPS Code and Maritime Security, INT’L MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897#what (last visited Jan.
10, 2017).
107. MarEx, The ISPS Code and Maritime Terrorism, MAR. EXECUTIVE (July
17, 2016, 7:39 PM), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/The-ISPSCode-and-Maritime-Terrorism-2014-07-17.
108. SOLAS XI-2 And The ISPS Code, INT’L MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx.
109. Id.
110. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS Amendments
2002,
SOLAS/CONF.5/34
annex
2
at
16,
http://www.ubak.gov.tr/BLSM_WIYS/DISGM/tr/HTML/20130304_142647_66
968_1_67502.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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2. International Labour Organization
The ILO is also crucial to establishing uniformity with respect
to seafarer rights.114 Established in 1919, this tripartite U.N.
agency is dedicated to setting labor standards amongst and between employers, workers, and Member States.115 The organization implements international labor standards, which are then
enforced through a supervisory system.116 On August 20, 2013,
the ILO established the Maritime Labour Convention, which
provides minimum working and living conditions for seafarers.117 This convention established the ILO as a supporter of the
maritime industry, leading to further agreements and regulations oL seaLarers’ rightsZ118
One of the most important conventions promulgated by the
ILO is ILO 185, which established a new kind of identity document for seafarers that serves as a special kind of passport and
inQludes the person’s Lull name, date of birth, and photo.119 The
ILO 185 convention was an addition to a previous convention,
the original :eaLarers’ Udentity foQu/ents !onvention oL F>B?
_9UL= FX?8^, whiQh Lirst reQogni`ed the need Lor a uniLor/ syste/
of identifying seafarers who enter foreign territories during the
course of their employment.120 Since then, ILO 185 was brought
to the ILO during the 91st Session of the International Labour
Conference, adopted in 2003, and entered into force on February
9, 2005.121

114. About the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-theilo/langKen/index.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
115. How the ILO Works, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/aboutthe-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/langKen/index.htm.
116. Applying And Promoting International Labour Standards, INT’L LABOUR
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/langKen/index.htm.
117. MLC, 2006: What It Is And What It Does, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/what-itdoes/langKen/index.htm.
118. See generally id.
119. GAO, supra note 31 at 60.
120. Id.
121. Seafarers’ Identity Documents: Background, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/briefingnote/wcms_162322.pdf; Seafarers’ Identity Documents, INT’L
LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/text/WCMS_162321/lang--en/index.htm (last visited July 23, 2017).
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ILO 185 is crucial in the recognition of shore leave as a seafarer right because the convention and the members of the convention address the importance of granting crew members access to temporary respite on land in order to rest, seek medical
attention, and even use the Internet.122 Most notably, the United
States is not a signatory to ILO 185, despite the fact that the
Convention originally met to address maritime security concerns in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the
United States.123 In establishing the right for seafarers to have
shore leave, Article 6 of ILO 185 highlights that each members
of the Convention shall permit the entry of a seafarer into its
territory iL that seaLarer has the appropriate and valid seaLarers’
identity document. 124
Following this obligation is part 6 of Article 6, which states
that 9Lor the purposes oL shore leave seaLarers shall not be re[
*uired to hold a visaZ8125 The ILO 185 convention allows for biometrics and electronic verification of credentials, which have the
potential to enhance security even further than what a normal
visa could because of the technology involved in maintaining this
kind of electronic database.126 This, among other more stringent
requirements, such as compliance with other international
travel regulations, are improvements from the original 1958 convention.127 ILO 185 signatories have agreed to comply with the
quality-control procedures for seafarer identity documents that

122. Security, Seafarers’ Shore Leave and ILO Convention 185, INT’L LABOUR
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_463114/lang--en/index.htm (last visited July 23, 2017).
123. See Ratifications of C1857Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised),
2003
(No.
185),
INT’L
LABOUR
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INS
TRUMENT_ID:312330 (last visited July 23, 2017). Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Congo, Croatia, France,
Georgia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, South Korea, Lithuania (although ILO 185 is not in force), Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro (Convention will
enter into force in October 2017), Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Vanuatu, and Yemen have
all ratified ILO 185. Id. Noticeably missing are the United States and Canada.
Id.
124. ILO 185, supra note 30, art. 6(4).
125. Id. art. 6(6).
126. GAO, supra 31, at 44.
127. Id. at 60.
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require standard issued secured identification numbers associated with seaLarers’ identity documents (SID), among standards
for maintain databases to store all of this information.128 The
guidance lists these and many more requirements, although it
does not go into more detail about how the procedures should
take place.129 Technical reports prepared by the ILO committees
regarding the success of biometric fingerprint databases concluded that the ILO 185 standards were performing very well
throughout the world.130
During discussions regarding amendments to the ILO in February 2015, representatives from other international organizations, interest groups, and member states reported on their successes in implementing the biometric requirements for seafarer
identity documents.131 Many countries reported that they were
transitioning from using their existing documentations, many of
whiQh are Qalled seaLarers’ booHs or sea/an’s booHs, that eaist
as independent seafarer passports, to the SIDs that are supported by biometric fingerprint data and the electronic databases that manage all of the information.132 Other countries reported concerns on budgeting for the expensive technologies and
receiving approval from their respective governments.133
A representative for the government of Norway, for example,
indicated that his country was processing new identification documents with the cooperation of his government.134 He expressed
that the identification cards were expensive to produce at
around forty euros per card, but highlighted that they were very
inexpensive to control and that seafarers could read the cards

128. See Arrangements Concerning the List of Members Which Fully Meet the
Minimum Requirements Concerning Processes and Procedures for the Issue of
Seafarers’ Identity Documents, INT’L LABOUR OFF. GENEVA 11N13 (2005),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/publication/wcms_191714.pdf.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Seafarers’
Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No. 185), MESIDC/2015/5,
INT’L LABOUR OFF. 5 (2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_norm/---normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_407638.pdf.
132. See generally id.
133. See generally id.
134. Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Seafarers’
Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No. 185), supra note 131 at 7.
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themselves on their mobile phones.135 A representative from the
United States, however, explained that his country still required
visas for seafarers, which was the main reason for his country
not ratifying ILO 185.136 Another representative expressed the
concerns surrounding enforcement of the United States Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires all travelers of the
United States to hold a valid passport and a valid nonimmigrant
visa.137 The United States was concerned about its visa requirement despite acknowledgment of the robust identification standards that were being considered by ILO 185.138 In response to
the 7nited :tates’ QonQerns, the UL= suggested diLLerent possi[
bilities that would allow them to ratify the convention and show
progress towards compliance.139 First, the ILO suggested that
the United States consider using the SID in processing visas for
shore leave, which could be implemented through expedited visa
issuances without the consular interviews and visa issuances at
ports with proof of SID.140 While the United States still expressed hesitance at these discussions, they agreed to consider
the possibility of expedited interviewing schedules for applicants
holding SIDs, given that they had ideally met some of the initial
eligibility requirements for the 7nited :tates’ !FYf and f Qrew[
member visas.141
III. U.S. POSITION ON SEAFARER SHORE LEAVE
SIDs are intended to be used on their own, without the addition of visas or any further identification credentials.142 Currently, the United States is the only maritime nation that requires foreign crews to have visas to apply for shore leave.143
Hanjin crews that were aboard vessels in U.S. waters were de-

135. Id. at 7.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Seafarers’
Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No. 185), supra note 131, at 7.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id.; the visas will be discussed in more detail, see discussion, infra part
III[B].
142. Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Seafarers’
Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No. 185), supra note 131.
143. Stevenson, supra note 35 at 1411.
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nied shore leave because they did not have the appropriate visas.144 The United States has justified the visa requirement with
reports and analyses after the September 11th terrorist attacks,
citing safety and security concerns.145 This Part will discuss the
history of shore leave in the United States by providing a detailed discussion of Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., which emphasizes the importance of shore leave for seafarers. This Part will
also highlight the measures that the United States has implemented in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks,
such as the visa requirement, detailing the types of nonimmigrant visas issued and the documentation needed before the visas are granted. It will then detail how the United States justifies its visa requirement as a way of ensuring national security.
Finally, in response to the 7nited :tates’ visa re*uire/ent, this
Part will examine the interest groups which work to promote
seaLarers’ rights while out at sea, inQluding the Unternational
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Sea/en’s !hurQh Unstitute, and the International Transport
WorHer’s WederationZ
A. The History of Shore Leave in the United States
Shore leave is a time-honored right that seeks to give sailors
the rest that is needed after being at sea for extended periods of
time.146 Allowing temporary respite on land was thought of as a
way Lor /ariners to literally 9get their Leet baQH on the ground
againZ8147 Historically, shore leave was granted to allow crewmembers to contact their families, as this technology was unavailable onboard the vessels.148 Although technology has rendered the need for shore leave obsolete, the right remains important with respect to ensuring the physical and psychological
wellbeing of crewmembers aboard long voyages.149 The right to
shore leave allows sailors to physically come off of their boats

144. Dawson & Engels, supra note 26.
145. Stevenson, supra note 35 at 1411.
146. ROBERTO TIANGCO & RUSS JACKSON, HANDBOOK OF RIGHTS AND CONCERNS
FOR MARINERS 106 (Cornell Maritime Press, 2002).
147. Id.
148. Security, Seafarers’ Shore Leave and ILO Convention 185, INT’L LABOUR
ORG.
(Mar.
24,
2016),
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_463114/lang--en/index.htm.
149. Id.
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and spend time on land in a country where they are not natural
citizens.150
In Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., the U.S. Supreme Court contemplated the necessity of allowing sailors to go ashore, and in
a landmark decision acknowledged the seaLarers’ right to shore
leave.151 In Aguilar, the plaintiff was injured while on shore
leave.152 The plaintiff was employed on the Steamship Beauregard, owned by the defendant Standard Oil Company.153 The
vessel was a part of the trading that occurred between New Orleans and the East Coast and Gulf ports.154 In this case, the vessel was moored off of Port Richmond, Philadelphia.155 Plaintiff
was granted shore leave and was injured on two different occasions, leading him to bring suit against the defendant for
maintenance and cure and wages.156 The lower courts ruled that
shore leave was unrelated to the plaintiLL’s e/ploy/ent and that
the defendant would not be liable for his injuries.157
While the Qourt struggled to deter/ine the e/ployer’s liability
to the injured sailor, it discussed the nature of shore leave and
what purpose it serves to the seafarer.158 Because the plaintiff
was injured while ashore, the court had to decide whether or not
he was acting within the duties of his employmentKand thus
whether he owed duties to the employerKwhile he was on
land.159 Ultimately, the court held that not only is shore leave
necessary to the nature of seafaring but also that it is inherently
a part of the job.160
The Aguilar court thus emphasized the connection between
shore leave and the nature of the work in which seamen engage.161 The Qourt e/phasi`ed that 9relaaation beyond the Qon[
fines of the ship is necessary if the work is to go on, more so that
it may move smoothly. No master would take a crew out to sea
if he could not grant shore leave, and no crew would be taken if
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
Id. at 733.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Id.
Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 733.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 733N34.
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it Qould never obtain itZ8162 This decision would help shape customary maritime law in the United States and its understanding
of shore leave. The Aguilar court acknowledged the unique work
of seafarers, given the physical risks of being at sea, as well as
the mental difficulties of being away from land for a long period
of time. The decision cites another case, Harden v. Gordon, in
which Justice Story opined about the peculiarities of seafarers.163 Justice Story observed that seaLarers were liable to 9sud[
den sickness from change in climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting laborZ8164 He emphasized the importance of protecting
seaLarers’ rights beQause oL the uni*ue nature oL their labor, not[
ing that it was an important policy consideration to protect this
class of citizens.165 Justice Story also noted that protecting seaLarer’s rights was also in the best interests oL the /erQhant own[
ers: that healthier crew would lead to smoother and more frequent voyages at lower wages.166 Better working conditions
would encourage more people to go to sea, despite the obvious
perils tied to the job.167
B. The U.S. Rationale for Requiring Seafarer Visas
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)168
compiled a report in January 2011 that analyzed ILO 185 and
its ability to protect the missions of various federal agencies,
which aim to protect against potential security risks who may
enter the country.169 The report emphasized the number of foreign seafarers that visit U.S. ports on a yearly basis, estimating

162. Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 734.
163. Aguilar (citing Harden v. Gordon, C.C., 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me.
Oct. 1, 1823)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. The GAO is referred to as the 9congressional watchdog8 that investigates the federal government’s spending of taxpayer dollars. About GAO, U.S.
GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited
July 23, 2017). The agency reports on policy initiatives and investigations that
could impact U.S. Congress’s actions. Id. The GAO’s January 2011 report is
especially important because it provides a thorough analysis and conclusion as
to why the United States still insists on upholding the visa requirement for
foreign seafarers. See GAO, supra note 31.
169. GAO, supra note 31, at i.
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that about five million seafarers entered the ports in 2009.170
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested that the GAO launch this report to look into possible
risks that could arise from foreign seafarers entering the United
States through ports and the maritime industry in general.171
The report noted that 9although there have been no reported ter[
rorist attacks involving seafarers on vessels transiting to U.S.
seaports, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) considers the illegal entry of an alien through a U.S. seaport by exploitation of mariti/e industry praQtiQes to be a Hey QonQernZ8172
1. The Visa Requirement
The United States imposes a visa requirement on any foreign
seafarer seeking to enter the United States, even for a short,
temporary stay.173 There are two types of nonimmigrant visas
that are issued by the :tate fepart/ent’s "ureau oL !onsular
Affairs to foreign seafarers: C1/D and D visas.174 The C1 is a
nonimmigrant visa that allows seafarers to be admitted to any
port of entry in the United States, including airports, which
would then transport them to and from their vessels.175 The C1
visa is intended for persons in immediate and continuous transit
through the United States to another country.176 A C1 visa for
seafarers is most commonly required when the person needs to
travel to the United States in order to meet and board their vessel.177 The D visa by itself, however, only allows seafarers to gain
temporary access to the United States if they are arriving by
170. Id. at 1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 8.
174. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(C), (D); Crewmember Visa, U.S. DEP’T
STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/other/crewmember.html (last visited July 23, 2017).
175. Id.
176. Transit Visa, U.S. DEP’T STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS,
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/other/transit.html (last visited July
23, 2017). The State Department defines immediate and continuous traffic as
9a reasonably expeditious departure of the traveler in the normal course of
travel as the elements permit and assumed a prearranged itinerary without
any unreasonable layover privileges.8 Id.
177. Crewmembers Traveling to Meet Vessels, U.S. DEP’T STATE, BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/other/crewmember.html#vessel (last visited July 23, 2017).
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ship.178 The D visa is a nonimmigrant visa for a seafarer intending to depart the United States on a vessel within 29 days.179
Thus, the combination C1/D visa allows seafarers to both gain
entry into the United States to travel to their vessels no later
than 29 days after entry into the country.180 The application process, with certain requirements varying by country, consists of
basic proofs of employment and other paperwork, along with an
interview.181 When applying for a C1/D visa, a person will need
a letter confirming employment, evidence of a travel itinerary
with a ticket showing planned departure from the United States,
doQu/entation showing the appliQant’s signiLiQant ties to his or
her country of residence and intent to stay there after the trip to
the United States, evidence of sufficient funds for travel, the DS160 nonimmigrant visa application with a photo, a valid passport, and payment of the visa issuance fee.182 With the nature of
employment at sea, many contracts are for twelve months of
work with a month or two of vacation time between contracts.183
While they are home for these short periods of time, seafarers
have found it difficult to schedule interviews at the United
States consulate offices because of their extensive visa application backlogs.184
The United States has been consistently strict about its adherence to its domestic laws that require visas for any seafarer seeking entry into the country.185 Further, the United States Department of State had previously implemented the use of crew list
visas that would proQess an entire ship’s Qrew on one visaZ186 The
State Department eliminated this approach in 2004 in an effort
to enhance security in the wake of a postNSeptember 11th national security climate and instead required that every crewmember undergo the visa application process and be issued a

178. GAO, supra note 31, at 8.
179. Crewmember Visa, supra note 174.
180. Id.
181. Crew/Transit: C1/D, FERMAN LAW, http://www.fermanlaw.com/Nonimmigrant-Work-Visas/C-1-D-Crewmembers.shtml (last visited July 23, 2017).
182. Id. The application fee for a South Korean citizen is currently $160 USD.
Crewmember Visa, supra note 174.
183. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 1423.
184. Id.
185. See Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Seafarers’
Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No. 185), supra note 131, at 6.
186. Id. at 7.
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crewmember visa for every temporary visit to the United
States.187
2. National Security
For the United States, the visa requirement serves as a necessary layer of protection to ensure security in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks.188 In its 2011 report, the GAO
noted U.S. concerns that crewmember visas could be exploited
by extremists seeking entry into the country through ports rather than through airports, which have heightened their security tactics since the September 11th attacks.189 The GAO, however, concedes that another U.S. agency, the Coast Guard, already assessed the possibility of such exploitation and found
that it was unlikely.190 Essentially, not everyone can be a seafarer because of the nature of the grueling work and seafarers
have made it such that the United States should not be so concerned with a threat piercing through by way of the shipping
industry. The report, however, fails to delve into further details
or analysis surrounding these conclusions.191 Interestingly, in
2009, the United States Coast Guard recognized the ILO 185
identity documents as a legitimate form of identification for foreign seafarers;192 yet, the GAO reported that ILO 185 did not
fully comply with its mission.193 The report notes that ILO 185
did not adequately consider the U.S. visa requirement, ultimately leading to the U.S. opposition to the convention.194
3. Interest Groups
Many interest groups and international organizations keep a
watchful eye on labor conditions for seafarers, especially conQerning the 7nited :tates’ visa re*uire/entZ Vroups have Qreated guidance that specifically outlines deadlines and timelines
to ensure that seafarers can get their visas on time before their
next voyages.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Stevenson, supra note 35 at 1407.
GAO, supra note 31 at 12.
Id.
See generally GAO, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41N43.
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Central to the IMO and the ILO is the idea that a seafarer, as
an employee of the ship that he or she is chartering, is deserving
of a period of rest after being out at sea for an extended period.
They all echo the need for the United States to loosen its visa
requirement and accept Hanjin crew members into their ports.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
:oQieties _9UW;!8^ is an eatensive hu/anitarian networH that
aims to provide medical and healthcare assistance throughout
the world without discrimination.195 Signatories to this group include domestic and international humanitarian organizations.196 In 1965, the IFRC enacted the Convention on Facilitation oL Unternational Mariti/e TraLLiQ _9W#L8^, whiQh Qalls Lor
the reduction of formalities and documentary requirements for
ships on international voyages.197 For example, FAL section 3.1
states that 9a valid passport shall be the basiQ doQu/ent provid[
ing public authorities with information relating to the individual
passenger on arrival or departure oL a shipZ8198 More specifically,
the standard in seQtion DZF>ZF highlights that 9dQcrew /e/bers
shall not be required to hold a visa for the purpose of shore
leaveZ8199 The convention ultimately serves as more evidence
that visa requirements and other restrictions on entry for seafarers are a problem amongst shipping companies.200
The :ea/en’s !hurQh Unstitute is an organization that serves
to further the interests of mariners and be the voice of those who
cannot represent themselves.201 They operate the world’s only
full-time free legal aid program for merchant mariners.202 The

195. Our Vision and Mission, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT
SOC’YS, http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/ (last visited
Jan. 10, 2017).
196. Id.
197. Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, INT’L
FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’YS (Apr. 9, 1965),
http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I258EN.pdf.
198. Id. sec. 3.1.
199. Id. sec. 3.19.1.
200. See id.
201. Johnathan Thayer, What’s In A Name? A Closer Look at the Seamen’s
Church Institute, SEAMEN’S CHURCH INSTITUTE (May 15, 2013), http://seamenschurch.org/article/what%E2%80%99s-in-a-name-a-closer-look-at-theseamen%E2%80%99s-church-institute.
202. SEAMENS’ CHURCH INSTITUTE, http://seamenschurch.org/csr (last visited
July 23, 2017).
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institute releases an annual report Qalled the 9:hore Leave :ur[
vey,8 whiQh outlines statistiQs regarding the denial oL shore
leave, along with suggestions and recommendations on how the
United States should proceed for the following year.203 The 2016
Shore Leave Survey reported that a total of 1,061 seafarers on
104 ships were denied shore leave in the United States.204 Specifically, the survey notes that of those 1,061 seafarers, 866 (81.6
percent) of them were denied leave because they did not have
visas.205 In the survey, however, it is unclear why the crewmembers failed to carry visas.206 Some possible explanations for crewmembers failing to have visas include that they had no time to
obtain the visas, that the shipowners did not provide assistance
in obtaining the visas, and that the costs were too prohibitive.207
In order to address the frequent denials, the 2016 Shore Leave
:u//ary, whiQh provides a report oL the :ea/en’s !hurQh Un[
stitute’s annual Lindings, e/phasi`es that the 7nited :tates
needs to adopt ILO 185 to enhance maritime security through
the Qonvention’s standards Lor seaLarer identiLiQation doQu[
ments.208
The Unternational Transport WorHers’ Wederation _9UTW8^ is an
international Lederation oL transport worHers’ unions that seeHs
to represent the broader interests of transport workers, including seafarers.209 In advocating for laborers on shipping vessels,
the ITF strongly supports ILO 185,210 stating that ILO 185 needs
to be followed in order to properly address the human rights and
labor standards of the international community because the
SIDs would facilitate faster and more effective grants of shore
leave.211 They have spoken out against what they believe to be
serious digressions from the treatment of seafarers in other nations.212 In effect, the ITF believes that shore leave is a right that

203. See generally 2016 Shore Leave Summary, SEAMEN’S CHURCH INST.,
http://seamenschurch.org/sites/default/files/sci-shore-leave-survey-2016.pdf.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 3.
208. See id. at 2.
209. What
We
Do,
INT’L
TRANSPORT
WORKERS’
FED’N,
http://www.itfglobal.org/en/about-itf/what-we-do/ (last visited July 23, 2017).
210. GAO, supra note 31 at 47.
211. MarEx, supra note 107; GAO, supra note 31 at 47.
212. MarEx, supra note 107.
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should be afforded to all seafarers and, by denying Hanjin employees this right, the United States is committing a serious
transgression against Hanjin crewmembers.213
Jeff Engels, an ITF inspector, visited the Hanjin Marine that
was anchored off the port of Seattle.214 Upon his examination,
Engels called the United States Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) direQtly, eaQlai/ing that 9shore leave dics a hu/an right
and that the seafarers should not be made to suffer due to the
Hanjin situation, which had nothing to do with their simple desire to walH around, s/ell a tree, and visit the loQal seaLarers’
QenterZ8215 With support Lro/ the UTW, a doQHers’ union protested
the actions of the United States from the shore, demanding that
Hanjin crewmembers be granted shore leave.216 Seeing this protest, UTW President Paddy !ru/lin stated that 9it should be in[
conceivable that they [Hanjin crewmembers] are being denied
that right. We hope that wiser heads at the CBP [United States
Customs and Border Protection] will now prevail and they will
be allowed ashoreZ8217
IV. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION: THE HANJIN BANKRUPTCY AND
THE UNITED STATES’ DENIAL OF SHORE LEAVE FOR HANJIN
CREW
Given the strong consensus from these interest groups against
the 7nited :tates’ visa re*uire/ent, there is a need to provide a
solution that proteQts seaLarer’s hu/an rightsZ This solution is
especially crucial, given the decline of the shipping industry. The
speed of air freight and other advancing technologies is rendering ocean freight more and more obsolete. The industry will
likely continue to suffer losses and situations such as the Hanjin
bankruptcy could easily become more common. In that case,
there will inevitably be more crew members left stranded on arrested ships that will need to go ashore in the United States.
While most of the Hanjin crew members have since been granted
shore leave or allowed to return home, the amount of time that
they were forced to stay aboard their ships was long enough to
deprive the/ oL basiQ needsZ The 7nited :tates’ reLusal to bring
the Hanjin crews ashore was to deny them of their rights to
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Dawson & Engels, supra note 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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shore leave. Should another shipping giant become bankrupt,
the United States must relax the visa requirement and grant the
crew leave to come ashore while the companies resolve some preliminary proceedings such as releasing their ships from arrest.
This Part will propose that the United States should implement in order to remedy the problem that the visa requirement
has created. A complex problem such as this requires a multistep
approach to remedying the issue. Accordingly, the United States
should get rid of the visa requirement altogether. Following that,
the United States should ratify ILO 185 and accordingly implement the use of its seafarer identity documents. Countries, such
as Singapore, have exemplified practical ways to begin accepting
crewmembers ashore without visas, and the United States
should follow these steps as a start to correcting this problem. In
the wake of shipping bankruptcies on the scale such as the Hanjin bankruptcy, this issue will not be going away soon, and the
United States must be better equipped to grant crew members
shore leave when such a situation does occur.
A. Implementation of ILO 185 by the United States Would
Protect Seafarer’s Rights
The United States should adopt ILO 185. In a situation where
equity demands the protection of labor standards and certain
basic human rights, the United States should allow the Hanjin
crewmembers to come ashore.218 Balancing the interests of the
crewmembers against the states to which they are seeking refuge, the interests weigh in favor of the crewmembers because of
the nature of their employment.219 While multiple international
regulations deem that crewmembers do not need visas for entry
into their vessel’s destination port, the 7nited :tates Qontinues
to be one of the only countries220 that insists on its visa requirement.221
The United States should get rid of the visa requirement altogether.222 This solution points to the ability of the ILO to establish uniformity throughout the international community, in
218. See GAO, supra note 31, at 60.
219. Dawson & Engels, supra note 26.
220. GAO, supra note 31, at 60.
221. THE IMLI MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW: VOLUME II:
SHIPPING LAW 228 (David Attard et al. eds., 2016) (citing the 2003 revisions to
the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention of 1958).
222. GAO, supra note 31, at 44.
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which the United States could carve out an appropriate solution
within those parameters that will also address the national security concerns of the country.223
During the Hanjin bankruptcy, while the United States continued to insist on its visa requirement, countries such as Singapore have exemplified by designating its port as a safe zone for
Hanjin ships to unload their cargo without fear of seizure.224
Since the collapse, almost a dozen Hanjin vessels have unloaded
their cargo in the port of Singapore.225 The U.S. visa requirement
does not allow for the flexibility that Singapore has exemplified
in the wake of human rights dangers or other emergencies. Instead, the United States has been inflexible and insists that the
visa will keep dangerous or undesired foreigners out of the country.226 The United States should consider this vignette and others that exemplify the treatment of seafarers that are posed in
difficult situations such as shipping bankruptcies, which have
proven to be uncertain and stressful for the crew members left
stranded at sea.
While the visa requirement is still staunchly prohibited in ILO
185, the suggestions made during discussions of ILO 185 amendments do make convincing arguments. In adopting ILO 185, the
United States should then implement the SIDs that are used by
ILO 185 signatories. The United States should rely on the rigorous standards that ILO 185 has set out and tested that ensure
that crew members have submitted compliant documentation,
including biometric fingerprinting technology as well as electronic verification of credentials.227
While the interview procedure as part of the visa applications
remains crucial to the United States Department of State, the
SID would eventually diminish the need for interviews because
the crewmembers would have already gone through an intense
vetting process. Removing the interview step in the scope of the
visa application process would reduce the total time that it currently takes to issue a visa. If the United States continues to
insist on issuing visas, then this would be the best approach to
223. Id.
224. MarEx, supra note 41.
225. Id.
226. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 1426.
227. See Arrangements Concerning the List of Members Which Fully Meet the
Minimum Requirements Concerning Processes and Procedures for the Issue of
Seafarers’ Identity Documents, supra note 128, at 12.
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ensure speedier process, especially for those like the Hanjin crew
members, who had a special interest in coming ashore as quickly
as possible. Hanjin crew members likely did not already have
crew member visas because they were never planning on coming
ashore in the United States; rather they expected their voyages
home to commence immediately after unloading the cargo from
their vessels. Regardless, there needs to be a system that allows
for seafarers to come ashore especially in the event of an unforeseen circumstance such as a shipping bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
Un EXFA, HanJin, onQe the world’s seventh largest shipping
company,228 LaQed a banHruptQy QrisisZ 7nLortunately, HanJin’s
bankruptcy proceeding was not the biggest issue surrounding
their financial downfall. In the background, Hanjin crewmembers were left stranded at sea on their vessels, with no indication
of when they would return to land to replenish their food or water, and seek medical attention. This denied the crewmembers
the care that they were entitled through ILO 185 and the SOLAS
convention of the IMO. This sentiment has been shared by
countless interest groups, including ITF, IFRC, and the Sea/en’s !hurQh UnstituteZ This Hind oL shipping banHruptQy will
likely occur again, since the shipping market continues to decline, making the need to address this issue more important now
than everZ The 7nited :tates’ visa re*uirement, which requires
that all foreign seafarers seeking to come ashore in the United
States must have a valid visa, will continue to be an obstacle for
seaLarers on stranded vessels oLL the 7nited :tates’ Qoasts, as it
does not properly address the seafarers’ right to shore leaveZ To
address this issue, the United States should get rid of its visa
requirement for seafarers, adopt ILO 185, and implement the
SIDs as promulgated by the International Labour Organization,
just as many other countries have been doing sinQe the UL= F?B’s
entry into force in 2005. In the grand scheme of international
conformity with maritime safety and security regulations, the
United States should allow seafarers ashore to rest and recharge
when they become small fish in a corporate bankruptcy battle
that should not affect their well-being. These human rights violations should not be ignored, and seafarers should be afforded
access to the shore. In these extraordinary circumstances, there
228. See infra INTRODUCTION.
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should be a greater concern surrounding the welfare of the human beings aboard stranded vessels. The United States has
failed to properly address the needs of these seafarers, and
should look to correct this problem to ensure that they will not
leave seafarers stranded at sea for months at a time again.
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